Why philosophical zombies matter
I first wrote about the mysteries of consciousness on this blog back in February 2006 . This prompted me to do some reading on the philosophy of mind, and in March 2006 I wrote more about consciousness. Though I didn't mention it directly in that post, a very compelling argument concerns what are called philosophical zombies . I would put the argument like this. First, ask yourself: Is it conceivable that there could be a thing that appears to be human but in fact has no conscious experience? In other words, a biological machine, identical to a human in every way, except that it has no free will, feels nothing, experiences nothing. To put it bluntly, a zombie . If your answer is no, then I would ask this: How can you know that some of the "humans" around you are not in fact zombies? Is there a device available that will measure consciousness? Granted we have tools that can measure aspects of the complex electrical and chemical activity in the brain. But complex electric...